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This paper is dedicated to Ed Rose who knew all of this and much more when 
ethnomethodology was still in its infancy. We’re just beginning to catch up. 
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... take up and set on its feet Ed Rose’s suggestion to revise 
the Cartesian cogito: ‘We think, therefore I am’. We enact 
practices together, ‘we think’, therefore I am. The ‘we think’ 
... consists of, is a weak name for, [the] lived orderliness of 
ordinary practices. (Garfinkel, 2002: 234) 
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Abstract 
We try to show that the fundamental grounds of psychological thinking 
about the domains of ‘culture’ and ‘the self’ (and their possible 
connections) are necessarily representationalist in the Cartesian sense. 
Rehearsing Heidegger’s critique of representationalism as the basic wrong 
turning taken by modern thinking generally (and by psychology in 
particular) with respect to what human being is, we move on to the 
possibility of a counter-representationalist respecification of the concept of 
culture. Here we mobilise ideas from Husserl and Heidegger (again), and 
also from the basic ethnomethodological theory of Sacks and Garfinkel, to 
argue for the primacy of culture as an order of practical-actional affairs that 
makes conceptualisations of a putative ‘self’ always an effect of, and 
subsequent to, that very (cultural) order itself. Accordingly, we end by 
briefly analysing an actual case of an explicitly cultural use of a supposedly 
intensional term, ‘agree’. 
 
Keywords: ethnomethodology, Husserl, Heidegger, Garfinkel, Sacks, 
culture, self, representationalism, agreement, critique of psychology. 
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1. The Cartesian Picture 
 
From the title of this special issue of Theory and Psychology, ‘Culture and Self’, 
we might reasonably begin with the assumption that psychology and 
psychological theory have a problem: the problem of finding a suitably grounded 
connection between two otherwise discrete entities called ‘culture’ and ‘the self’. 
It is as though, on the one hand, we had a public realm of material practice and 
action, visible for all to see and hear; a kind of environment with certain ordering 
principles and relatively dependable properties that can be found and 
investigated by empirical means. Then, on the other hand, we appear to have the 
lonely world of private internality; a self construed primarily as immaterial mind 
or as a constellation of cognitive processes. Admittedly, on such a picture, this self 
may be donated, or housed within, a body that acts and participates in the 
material environment, but this aspect of it is irrelevant to — or, at best, a conduit 
to — the inner psychic sanctum, positive knowledge of which is psychology’s 
(especially cognitivism’s) ultimate goal. 
 
Given the prevalence of such a picture — the fact that it is a (if not the) grounding 
assumption of almost all Western psychological thinking today — the postulated 
connections between ‘culture’ and ‘the self’, naturally enough, tend to be a set of 
mental predicates: thinking, knowing, agreeing, intending, cognising, and so 
forth. The culture-self question can then only be asked in terms such as: how does 
the self come to know its culture? Or: how is culture thinkable? — and so forth. In 
a word, the picture is representational at core.1 Culture, as just one feature (or, 
worse still, ‘variable’) of the outer environment, is postulated as something the 
inner self is capable of making a representation of, either by virtue of having such 
representational capacities (especially for language) hard-wired into its very 
                                                 
1. In this sense then psychology has yet to move beyond the early Wittgensteinian 
picture theory of the world and the things in it, and hence beyond the disciplinary 
sterility Wittgenstein diagnosed in the Philosophical Investigations (1958). 
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being (cf. Chomsky), or by virtue of its gradual formation of representations via 
experiential learning from external inputs (cf. Moscovici via Skinner and Piaget). 
But regardless of which path is chosen — cognitivist or experientialist or some 
hybrid of the two — the fundamental representationalist grounding remains. 
 
This picture of things is at once both fairly old and relatively recent. It is more-or-
less co-extensive with modernity itself, a period inaugurated by the Cartesian 
separation between, roughly, the physical and the transcendental realms. Button, 
Coulter, Lee and Sharrock neatly summarise the position as follows: 
The world is essentially physical in a specifically restricted sense of that 
term, but the human mind is transcendental. The human body is a feature 
of the physical world, is a res extensa, but the human mind is cut from non-
physical cloth, and is a res cogitans, lacking mass and having no spatio-
temporal co-ordinates. One of the most important functions of the res 
cogitans is to endow the otherwise colourless, tasteless, odourless and 
silent world with its actually experienced colours, tastes, odours, sounds 
and so on. It accomplishes this astounding feat by integrating the input 
from the sensorium and presenting us with a rich internal representation 
utterly unlike the ‘real’ material world whose causal forces acting upon us 
help to generate this illusion of itself, an illusion which, apparently, only a 
scientifically grounded philosophy can show to be such. (Button et al, 1995: 
39) 
And, of course, we may add that this has more recently become the self-appointed 
task of a ‘scientifically grounded’ psychology. But there are innumerable 
problems with this picture. Several basic parameters of these are well known and 
can be roughly listed as follows: 
 
1. The extensional realm (the realm of res extensa) becomes utterly unknowable in 
and of itself. It is only accessible via internal representations. 
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2. These essential representations, as such, are strictly illusional: they have no 
externally validatable means of assessing their own veridicality or non-
veridicality. (Descartes himself, as we will see below, makes validation itself an 
internal ‘faculty’ called ‘intellect’.) Contemporary psychology, of course, lays 
claim to the ability to ‘measure’ this Cartesian capacity, and also to provide the 
technologies whereby the existence and ‘validity’ of these otherwise illusory 
representations may be externally gauged. 
3. On this picture, the human being is like an automaton inhabited by a 
controlling ghost. For it, action in the world is accomplished after the manner of a 
superbly sophisticated machine — but a machine nonetheless.2 
4. Action is thereby accomplished in the following way: the human machine finds 
itself in a particular external environment (a situation) which appears audible, 
visible, tangible, etc., via sensory inputs. With ‘black-box’ behaviourism out of 
fashion, these data are then checked against an internalised but immaterial set of 
‘look-up’ rules (either acquired from previous experience or else hard-wired). 
Once an appropriate rule is found, the machine acts, automatically, according to 
its instructions and, if successful, something like a competent action takes place. 
To be human on this reading is to be, to all intents and purposes, 
indistinguishable from being something equivalent to a thermostat. 
5. In this way, there is effectively a ‘feedback loop’ postulated between self and 
environment. Competent socio-cultural action is accordingly equated with the 
degree of correspondence between extensional conditions and intensional rules. 
Any severe lack of correspondence may be deemed a ‘psychological problem’ or 
as indicative thereof. 
6. Other persons (those posulated by the self as outside itself) are opaque to the 
self; they are no more than further extensional things. The self may assume that 
                                                 
2. Mr Data in Star Trek comes to mind here. Oddly enough, however, Data’s capacity for 
interrogating his own intensionality, for knowing his own knowing, is denied not only to 
the humans who wrote Star Trek, but also to the rest of us according to currently 
influential formulations such as Self-Categorisation Theory. The ghost in the machine is 
alienated from its self. 
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they too are governed by intensional rule-arrays but it can never know this 
precisely because extensional things are utterly inaccessible in and of themselves. 
(Point 1, above.) 
7. It is nevertheless convenient for the self to hypothesise or ‘project’ the existence 
of ‘other minds’; for this allows such facilities as language to be construed as 
telementational devices; that is, as means for transporting immaterial contents 
(such as thoughts, intentions, motives, (dis)agreements, attitudes, beliefs, ideas 
and so forth) from one mind to what that mind thereby supposes to be another or 
others like it. 
 
It is little wonder, then, that the self-culture connection is a mystery to be solved. 
The initial conditions of the Cartesian picture of human being have set it up 
precisely to be a problem. And we can see this by asking an apparently simple 
question: where, in the picture, is culture? Several candidates are now possible 
apart from the initial idea that culture might be among the features of the 
extensional environment. Culture might instead be the set of cognitive ‘look-up’ 
rules for sense-making itself, now postulated — under Social Representations 
Theory for example — as somehow ‘shared’ between otherwise separate 
intensional entities (e.g., ‘minds’). Thus, under this view, it can be argued that: ‘a 
representation is social ... if it is, or has been, in two or more minds’ (Farr, 1998: 
xii). Again, culture could be the set of possible competent actions or suites of 
actions that are generated by correspondence between intensional rules and 
extensional situations (cf. Script Theory). Further still: culture might be the array 
of telementational possibilities of communicational faculties such as language. Or 
else it might be the manifold of intensional contents (thoughts, etc.) that are 
putatively transported by such devices. And no doubt there are several other 
candidates available from the general Cartesian schematic of the self. 
 
Putting this simply: the model is in crisis from the start. If it is thought of as a 
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single paradigm of what it is to be human, it nevertheless generates multiple and 
sometimes contradictory candidates for culture and its locus. To put this another 
way: insofar as it is impossible to construe human social existence without a 
workable concept of culture, the dominant Cartesian picture of human being 
completely obviates anything that might go by the name of a social psychology. 
Assuming we have an interest in preserving such a possibility — that is, assuming 
we might want, as part and parcel of psychology, to be able to discover aspects of 
human socio-cultural being — we would then have to unpick and dismantle the 
Cartesian picture from the ground up. Fortunately, a number of thinkers have 
already made in-roads into this territory. 
 
 
2. Heidegger’s Anti-picture 
 
Perhaps the most trenchant of these thinkers was Martin Heidegger.3 In his 
important essay ‘The Age of the World Picture’ (1997), Heidegger makes a 
thorough (and, in the strict sense, ‘destructional’) reading of the picturing or 
representationalist version of thinking man’s relation to the world. That is, his 
primary objection to the Cartesian picture is simply that it is itself a picture: a 
picture that, in turn, poses a picturing or representational relation between ‘man’ 
and world. In this sense, it only works (or appears to work) because it is itself an 
instance of the very thing that it postulates. At heart, it is a boot-strapping 
operation. Or else, like Baron Munchausen, every Cartesian must pull themselves 
up by their own hair. 
 
Looking more closely, Heidegger examines this apparently self-authenticating 
postulation as a particular moment or movement in historical thought. All forms 
                                                 
3. Part of this discussion is based on an as-yet unpublished paper, ‘“The Twisted 
Handiwork of Egypt” and Heidegger’s Question Concerning Culture’. Copies are 
available on request. 
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of thought, even prior to the Cartesian moment, he says, are marked by a 
particular sub-iectum: a sub-ject in the sense of something lying primarily before, 
as the principal subject of interest. For the pre-Socratics, for example, the 
subiectum may well have been substance itself. Their principal interest appears to 
have been something like: from what is everything that there is made up? In this 
form of thought, there is no distinguishing between animate and inanimate 
matter, let alone between human and non-human things. The human being is 
accorded no special status. So the subiectum in general, as a principle of thinking 
and as the principal thought of an era, does not necessarily have to be man-as-
subject: 
What is decisive [with modernity] is not that man frees himself to himself 
from previous obligations, but that the very essence of man itself changes, 
in that man becomes subject. We must understand this word subiectum, 
however, as the translation of the Greek hypokeimenon. The word names 
that-which-lies-before, which, as ground, gathers everything onto itself. 
This metaphysical meaning of the concept of the subject has first of all no 
special relationship to man and none at all to the I. (Heidegger, 1997: 128; 
final emphasis added) 
The thinking of modernity, though, is marked by a move to a new and specific 
subiectum, ‘man’ in a rather specific sense of that term: 
However, when man becomes the primary and only real [ersten und 
eigentlichen] subiectum, that means: Man becomes that being upon which 
all that is, is grounded as regards the manner of its Being and its truth. Man 
becomes the relational center of that which is as such. But this is possible 
only when the comprehension of what is as a whole changes. (1997: 128) 
We should note with respect to this passage (including the part of it quoted just 
prior) that what is effected here is not just that the subiectum becomes ‘man’ — 
which is the case — but also that ‘man’ becomes the primary [ersten], even the 
only [eigentlichen], subiectum. In a clarifying passage, that is, Heidegger states, 
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with respect to the subiectum in general, that: ‘We must first remove the concept 
“man” — and therefore the concepts “I” and “I-ness” as well — from the concept 
of the essence of subiectum. Stones, plants and animals are subjects — something 
lying-before of itself — no less than man is’ (Heidegger, 1982b: 97). In this respect 
we should read the advent of modernity not just as the becoming-subject of ‘man’ 
but also, and more importantly, as ‘man’ becoming the first, and so, for himself, as 
far as he is concerned, the only subject. 
 
And what is so peculiar to this rather sudden change; what is so special about 
‘man’ once he or it becomes the only principal subject? It is this: how being itself 
can be thought undergoes a fundamental shift. With the advent of man-as-subject 
— with the Cartesian moment — everything that is becomes an object for a 
subject. Being itself is, if one likes, permanently subject-ified. And, just as 
importantly, the primary thing-in-the-world that ‘man’ takes as an object for his 
own subjectification of being is this: no less than man himself. This may be the 
essential defining moment of modern psychology, then. Heidegger’s basic insight 
is that the study of ‘man’ only becomes possible when ‘man’-as-subject appears 
and, to boot, takes himself as his own primary object of thought. The problem, 
then, is not simply one of so-called mind-body dualism: it is deeper than that and 
goes to the core of a radical change in how ‘what is’ (what it is for anything, 
including ourselves, to be) can be thought. From the advent of modernity, 
everything in the world is transformed into a representation (a picture) for a 
specially privileged subject. ‘Man’, as the ‘I’, as ‘consciousness’, as ‘mind’, and as 
a host of further intensional postulates, moves to centre stage and assumes the 
dominant position of determining the entirety of what is and can be. 
 
Emmanuel Levinas brings this to light. What Heidegger reads as the picturing or 
representationalist version of thinking man’s relation to the world, Levinas refers 
to, more narrowly perhaps, as ‘idealism’. The fact that Heidegger and Levinas 
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mean much the same thing by these terms, however, is clear from the following 
passage of Levinas’s careful reading which, because it is of such moment for 
psychological thinking today, we will quote from at length: 
The concept of the subject, understood as a substance having a specific 
position in the entire domain of being, presents us with difficulties of two 
kinds. First, how do we understand this leave-taking from the self which 
the thinking substance brings about and which displays an entirely original 
aspect? Indeed, we could say that thought, in reaching out toward objects, 
does not actually take leave of itself, since its objects — considered as ideas 
and contents of thought — are, in a certain sense, already within it. In order 
to make sense of this paradox, Descartes had to invoke the existence of a 
veridical god who guaranteed the correspondence between things and 
ideas. Furthermore, he had to reflect on truth’s method and criteria — a 
reflection and preoccupation endemic to modern philosophy. Such 
reflection is a basic requirement for subjectivity enclosed within itself 
which must search within its own interior for signs of its conformity with 
being. From there, it is but a step to idealism. Henceforth, the thinking 
substance will not have to reunite with extended substance; it will recover 
that extended substance within itself. The subject itself will constitute its 
own object. Idealism comes to be one of the consequences both of the 
Cartesian cogito and of the theories of knowledge whose flourishing has 
been fostered by this new conception of the subject. (Levinas, 1996: 12) 
 
Here, then, we arrive at the ultimate problem with the Cartesian picture: the res 
extensa is made to vanish into, to be subsumed by, the res cogitans. Accordingly, 
any primordial (pre-subjective) external, environmental, actional, social, public 
thing (e.g., a cultural object, event or situation) becomes an effective impossibility. 
The Cartesian picture means that the self must eternally precede culture and that 
the latter must remain epiphenomenal: a mere representation or manifold of 
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representations. Little wonder then that psychology, like contemporary Cultural 
Studies (to name just one salient discipline which dominant thought in 
psychology would repudiate as ‘unscientific’), cannot but repeat Descartes 
himself. In Descartes’ own words: 
Where knowledge of things is concerned, only two factors need to be 
considered: ourselves, the knowing subjects, and the things which are the 
objects of knowledge. As for ourselves, there are only four faculties which 
we can use for this purpose, viz. intellect, imagination, sense-perception 
and memory. It is of course only the intellect that is capable of perceiving 
the truth, but it has to be assisted by imagination, sense-perception and 
memory if we are not to omit anything which lies within our power. As for 
the objects of knowledge, it is enough if we examine the following three 
questions: What presents itself to us spontaneously? How can one thing be 
known on the basis of something else? What conclusion can be drawn from 
each of these? This seems to me a complete enumeration and to omit 
nothing which is within the range of human endeavour. (Descartes, 1985: 
39) 
And now in the words of Cultural Studies guru, Stuart Hall: 
According to [our constructivist approach], we must not confuse the 
material world, where things and people exist, and the symbolic practices 
and processes through which representation, meaning and language 
operate. Constructivists do not deny the existence of the material world. 
However, it is not the material world which conveys meaning: it is the 
language system or whatever system we are using to represent [!] our 
concepts. (Hall, 1997: 25) 
To make cultural things central, then, we have to start to find a way outside or 
beyond the dominant representationalism we are all but condemned to find in the 
available (cultural) disciplines today. 
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3. Husserl, Heidegger, Sacks, Garfinkel 
 
Attempting to take a step in this direction, Edmund Husserl repostulated culture 
as, in his terms, ‘the intuitive life world’ (Lebenswelt). Also reacting against the 
sterility of the Cartesian picture and its massively negative hold on the European 
sciences (particularly the human sciences), Husserl made it clear, possibly for the 
first time, that while this picture was the very cornerstone of psychological 
thinking, it also made any effective psychology a logical impossibility: 
The psychic, considered purely in terms of its own essence, has no physical 
nature, has no conceivable in-itself in the natural sense, no spatio-temporal 
causality, no idealisable and mathematisable in-itself, no laws after the 
fashion of natural laws; here there are no theories with the same 
relatedness back to the intuitive life-world, no observations or experiments 
with a function for theorising similar to natural science — in spite of the 
self misunderstandings of empirical experimental psychology. (Husserl, 
1970: section 64)4 
To establish any effective social science — and by implication, to find one that can 
actually begin with something like ‘culture’ rather than leaving it to trail in the 
wake of supposedly more essential internal affairs — we need to begin by looking 
for an analytic which, unlike either cognitivism or constructivism, does have what 
Husserl calls ‘relatedness back to the intuitive life-world’. That is, we need to 
begin by postulating an always-already intersubjective, material public realm 
which has ordering principles above and beyond those which might be located in 
any Cartesian version of ‘mind’, ‘representation’, ‘consciousness’ and so forth. 
Husserl at least starts along this path with his initial idea of the life-world: 
For the life-world — the ‘world for us all’ — is identical with the world 
that can be commonly talked about. Every new apperception leads 
                                                 
4. We are grateful to Steve Schofield for the two passages from Husserl cited here.  
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essentially, through apperceptive transference, to a new typification of the 
surrounding world and in social intercourse to a naming which 
immediately flows into the common language. Thus the world is always 
such that it can be empirically, generally (intersubjectively) explicated and, 
at the same time, linguistically explicated. (Husserl, 1970: section 59) 
Here, then, is the glimmering of a new configuration. We begin by posing an 
actually lived world which is not mediated through a single and primordial 
subject but is ‘for us all’ prior to any possible individuation. And instead of 
language being a form of telementation (carrying mental contents from one mind 
to a possible second or third), it is now posed as essential to the constitution of 
that world. The life-world is identical with the world of common discourse. In 
place of the lonely perceiving subject, we now pose a general process of 
‘apperception’: a term which should not be mistaken as referring to any 
psychologistic process whatsoever since apperception is always already a 
collective public process, something that cannot be done alone outside the 
already-established collective realm. In short, the life-world is a working together 
in, for example, language in order to produce that very world itself as a concrete, 
material, audio-visually available order of public affairs and actions. This is not 
constructivism in Hall’s sense.5 Rather it is an attempt to put on the map an 
intrinsic connection between overtly public language and action that is posed as 
the initial condition of what it is to be human and hence as prior to the formation 
of anything that might, as it were, arrive later such as, for example, ‘a sense of a 
self’. 
 
Of course, Heidegger is famous, in the early parts of Being and Time (1962), for 
his insistence that, roughly, social practice — actually doing things in the world 
— must precede any ‘mentalistic’ construal of that practice. Rorty (1993: 356) puts 
                                                 
5. Nor indeed in the sense most commonly encountered in so-called post-crisis social 
psychology. In this context, Derek Edwards’s (1997) distinction between epistemological 
and ontological constructionism provides a useful clarification. 
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this baldly: ‘the recognition ... that social practice is determinative of what is and 
is not up to social practice is Heidegger’s crucial insight in this work’. Heidegger’s 
analytic of Dasein (‘being there’) — which cannot be fully developed here (See 
McHoul, 1998) — insists that, for example, an otherwise psychological concept 
like ‘understanding’ can in fact be respecified in terms of actual collective practice. 
To use his famous example: to understand a hammer, I do not first cognise it as a 
res extensa present before my consciousness as res cogitans; I do not work with 
mental representations of, say, its head and its handle. Rather, I learn to hammer. 
To understand the hammer is to be able to do hammering in a way that anyone 
like me (any Dasein, any being of my ontological sort) can recognise as competent 
hammering. Understanding, then, is not first and foremost an intensional, 
‘psychological’ or psychical process, rather: 
In German we say that someone can vorstehen something — literally stand 
in front or ahead of it, that is, stand at its head, administer, manage, preside 
over it. This is equivalent to saying that he versteht sich darauf, 
understands in the sense of being skilled or expert at it, has the know how 
of it. The meaning of the term ‘understanding’ ... is intended to go back to 
this usage in ordinary language. (Heidegger, 1982a: 276)6 
This passage is cited by Mark Okrent whose book, Heidegger’s Pragmatism, 
should be compulsory reading for psychologists. Okrent concludes: 
Practical understanding of a tool is the capacity to use the tool in a variety 
of practical contexts for a variety of purposes.... The capacity to act in such 
a way is part of what it is to be Dasein, and every Dasein, as Dasein, is 
always actually acting coherently in some way or another so as to achieve 
                                                 
6. This passage carries interesting echoes of Wittgenstein who wrote that: 
We are under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound, essential, in our 
investigation, resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable essence of language. 
That is, the order existing between the concepts of proposition, word, proof, truth, 
experience, and so on. This order is a super-order between — so to speak — 
super-concepts. Whereas, of course, if the words ‘language’, ‘experience’, ‘world’, 
have a use, it must be as humble a one as that of the words ‘table’, ‘lamp’, ‘door’. 
(Wittgenstein, 1958: §97) 
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some end or another. It is thus always displaying its practical 
understanding of tools. (Okrent, 1988: 38; emphasis added). 
 
Suitably equipped, we can now begin to see a way of placing public socio-cultural 
talk and action at the start of a possible social psychology. If ‘understanding’, just 
for one example, can be de-intensionalised and respecified actionally — that is, in 
terms of how social practice always and necessarily self-discloses its own 
coherence or methodicalness — then we should (though we won’t try it here) 
have no genuine difficulties performing similar operations on other psychological 
mainstays such as knowing, agreeing, intending, having attitudes, motives, 
reasons and so forth. (For a summary of some such attempts, see Potter and 
Edwards, 2003. We also note Jeff Coulter’s (1979: 37) very helpful analysis of the 
actional usage of ‘understand’ as what he refers to as a ‘terminus verb’. These 
approaches are compared in McHoul and Rapley (2003).) 
 
It may be mere coincidence (or not), but the fundamental insight of Heidegger’s 
analytic of Dasein — that social practice, qua social practice, is both (a) primordial 
(in the sense that ‘it’ itself ‘decides’ what counts as social practice) and (b) self-
disclosing — has an almost direct repetition in the work of the founders of 
ethnomethodology, Harold Garfinkel and Harvey Sacks.7 
 
In a series of lectures from 1965 — in the current context, interestingly titled 
‘Culture and Personality’ — Sacks (1992: 135-231) pondered how best to think 
through the kind of a thing that a culture is. He starts with the metaphor of a 
‘machinery’ for getting things done. For example, in a well-known analysis, he 
asks how it is that, when we hear a couple of adjacent sentences like ‘The baby 
cried. The mommy picked it up’, we cannot but hear it that the mommy is the 
                                                 
7. For a fuller explication of the relevance of Sacks to theoretical questions in psychology, 
see McHoul and Rapley (2000; 2001). 
Culture and the Self | 17 
mommy of the baby, even though the sentences contain neither possessive nor 
genitive expressions. The ‘machinery’ or ‘apparatus’ that he derives from this 
turns out to be enormously consequential for the building of things we might call 
cultures. The whole analysis cannot be rehearsed here (see Sacks, 1972; Silverman, 
1998: 74-97): suffice to say that it leads to a significant, materialist (counter-
psychologistic) description of how it is that cultural members in general (not as 
particular monads or ‘individuals’) go about ‘understanding’ one another via the 
use of membership categories. So, right from the start, we can see that Sacks is re-
specifying the very ideas of ‘personality’ or the ‘self’. That now turns out to be the 
kind of a thing that people may be said to have by virtue of how they operate 
with, and are operated on by, membership categorisation devices: a describable 
cultural machinery, tool, or apparatus. 
 
In an appendix to the lectures, Sacks says something quite remarkable which is 
picked up and further explicated by Schegloff in his Introduction. Sacks writes: 
A culture is an apparatus for generating recognizable actions; if the same 
procedures are used for the generating as for the detecting [cf. 
recognizing], that is perhaps as simple a solution to the problem of 
recognizability as is formulatable. (Sacks, 1992: 226; and see Schegloff in 
Sacks, 1992: xxxvi) 
This is a remarkable step in the direction we are trying to take away from the 
Cartesian-representationalist conception of culture and the self. It suggests that if 
we look at socio-cultural practice as an ensemble of methods (a machinery or 
apparatus), what we find is that the methods for the production (or generation) of 
competent actions are identical with the methods for their recognition as just 
those actions and not something else. We can ‘know’ or ‘recognise’ that such and 
such (for example an instance of categorising one person as ‘the baby’ and 
another as ‘the mommy’) has been competently brought off — as just that cultural 
practice and not some other — because that is precisely how we would do it 
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ourselves if we had to do so. The cultural machinery works both ways: to use it 
competently is identical with disclosing its operations in and as the very use of it! 
 
Schegloff matches up this insight of Sacks’s with that of Garfinkel who says the 
following of his own ethnomethodological studies: 
Their central recommendation is that the activities whereby members 
produce and manage settings of organized everyday affairs are identical 
with members’ procedures for making those settings ‘account-able’.... 
When I speak of accountable my interests are directed to such matters as 
the following. I mean obervable-and-reportable, i.e., available to members 
as situated practices of looking-and-telling. (Garfinkel, 1967: 1) 
This is, if one likes, a clear social-theoretical operationalisation of Heidegger’s 
fundamental insight. A culture is an arrangement of social practices such that the 
doing of them comes absolutely and utterly first: but such that the very doing of 
them — and not something superadded to them, something coming along later 
such as a thought, or a cognition of any sort — discloses (makes account-able) 
how they are to be understood or recognised. Cultural action is, in and as its very 
accomplishment, self-disclosing as to what it is, what it does, what it means, how 
one is to understand or recognize it, and so on down through a very long list of 
matters that are now no longer mistakeable as, for example, intensional states or 
processes. 
 
There is no ghost in the cultural machinery. And whatever this mysterious ‘self’ 
may or may not still turn out to be — should we still need such a concept when 
both ‘Dasein’ and ‘membership’ seem better equipped for our purposes — this 
much is certain about it: it comes along as part and parcel of the cultural 
machinery because it can’t arise anywhere or anyhow else. Either that, or we’re 
back to Descartes and the explicit grounding of psychology in illusion. 
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4. A Mundane Example: (Dis)agreement 
 
Since we are interested in the question of self and culture, and its respecification 
along practical lines, we might open up a very basic question as an example: what 
would it be for persons to agree or disagree upon something? In the Cartesian 
tradition, by-and-large inherited by psychology today — especially in its 
cognitivist guises — agreement would be something like a meeting of minds. Two 
separate intensional domains would somehow (how?) concur on a set of 
extensional circumstances; and, just possibly, that ‘agreement’ could become the 
basis for a wider acceptance of the (still-ultimately-unknowable) extensional 
‘facts’ in question. Then, perhaps, that ‘wider acceptance’ could be the grounds 
for something like a culture: and indeed this is not so far from the basic premises 
of Social Representations Theory. But what happens, after Husserl, Heidegger, 
Garfinkel and Sacks, if we refuse to start with intensional selves and begin instead 
with such matters as ‘agreement’ conceived of not as ‘mental states’ to be 
discerned (still less measured and their congruence quantified) in two separate 
departments of internal affairs, but rather in terms of their always-already public 
(social and cultural) status? 
 
To re-cite three crucial parts of our argument so far, Heidegger showed that: 
an(y) otherwise psychological concept like ‘understanding’ [cf. agreement] 
can in fact be respecified in terms of actual collective practice; 
And that: 
every Dasein, as Dasein, is always actually acting coherently in some way 
or another so as to achieve some end or another. 
Additionally, Sacks: 
re-specifies the very ideas of ‘personality’ or the ‘self’. That now turns out 
to be the kind of a thing that people may be said to have by virtue of how 
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they operate with, and are operated on by, membership categorisation 
devices: a describable cultural machinery, tool, or apparatus. 
 
So what of something like ‘agreement’? In the following data extract we present 
part of a clinical interview between a paediatrician and the parents of a child 
brought to her surgery for possible diagnosis of their son as ‘suffering from’ 
Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). At the start of the extract, the 
mother is referring to her son’s school psychologist and his earlier diagnosis 
based on a questionnnaire: 
 
Mo: He- he's one 'v those people th't (1.0) makes 
th- like th- say the diagno[sis= 
Dr:                            [Mm 
Mo: =themselves 
Dr: Mm hm 
  → Mo: and then expects ev'rybody to agree with [him 
Dr:                                          [Mm= 
Dr: =Mm hm, mm hm 
Mo: E:rm that questionnaire th't he w's talking 
about I filled that out 
Dr: ↑Ye:s ((Child enters; short inaudible 
exchange)) 
Fa: Knock on the door next time 
Mo: I- it w's all based on (.) sch↓ool 
Dr: Mm 
Mo: [The questions were what's he like in the= 
Dr: [Mm 
Mo: =[cla:ss[room 
Dr:  [Mm    [Mm 
Dr: Mm 
Mo: I can't answer that [as a parent= 
Dr:                     [Mm yes 
Mo: =because I'm not in the cla:ssroom 
Dr: °Yes° 
Mo: E:rm (1.5) so I had to try:: an (1.5) 
?: (    ) 
?: °Thank you° 
Mo: Rewo::rd it 
Dr: Yes 
Mo: Em (.) to >like outside 'v< the cla:ssroom 
Dr: Mm mm 
Mo: Y'know like the question was (1.0) does he 
concentrate on his school work [for= 
Dr:                                [Mm 
Mo: =long periods a time >an I'd have to sit there 
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'n go< okay the- does he concentrate (.) 
watchin' TV 
 
The marked line shows the mother’s orientation to the possible notion of 
agreeing with another person, in this case the school psychologist. Her adduced 
reasons for not agreeing, in the rest of the extract, are highly detailed and have 
everything to do with practical matters and nothing to do with that person’s (nor 
her own) interiority. The mother’s non-agreement is referenced to her reading of 
the professional instrument (the questionnaire) as flawed. It was based on the 
school; it had to do with her son’s conduct in the classroom. The mother makes it 
materially plain that she is ‘not in the classroom’ (note her emphasis) and so she 
had to extrapolate from the son’s conduct at home: such as his concentration on 
TV. And again, we hear ‘concentration’ as a description of her son’s publicly 
visible conduct, not as some mysterious quantum of interiority available for 
disposal in social space. All of these matters — and there are several more in the 
transcript — have to do with practical, everyday, audio-visually available details 
and not with any supposed interiority of the person agreed (or disagreed) with. 
 
To agree (or, in this case, not) is then by no means a Cartesian procedure (or a 
failure thereof). It has to do with the material circumstances of using a particular 
instrument, tool or technology — here, a questionnaire — and its comparative 
relevance to different memberships. For the school psychologist, the instrument 
is objectively valid, we presume, and used for ADHD-type diagnoses wherever 
and by whomsoever. (Elsewhere in the transcript, we hear, for example, that the 
son’s teacher has been asked to complete the same questionnaire.) For the 
mother, not agreeing with the school psychologist is identical with, and rendered 
visible in, her account of the deficiency of the instrument in its asking of 
questions of a membership category (family) which could not reasonably (i.e., 
publicly and socially, for any cultural member) be presumed to know the fine 
details of classroom conduct. These are the material circumstances under which 
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she practically achieves (to revisit Heidegger) ‘some end or another’ — i.e., the 
raising of a complaint to one professional about another and so, as the 
consultation proceeds, to ‘eliminate the possibility’ of an ADHD diagnosis. 
(‘Eliminate the possibilty’ are the mother’s own words, used close to the start of 
the consultation.) And note that the mother’s complaint is pervasively attentive 
to cultural matters, for instance to the asymmetric entitlements of ‘lay’ and 
‘professional’ category memberships. Here what every competent member 
‘knows’ is delicately attended to by the mother in her accomplishment of 
disagreement: she does not directly avow disagreement via a telling. For 
example, she does not say ‘he expects everybody to agree with him but I don’t’. 
Rather she brings off the disagreement with a supposed ‘expert’, as such, by 
accounting (for) the grounds of that disagreement through reportage of her 
practical actions in the world. That is to say, reinvoking Heidegger’s metaphor: 
rather than making a readily defeasible claim to expertise in ‘hammer-ology’, she 
hammers. 
 
In at least one ordinary everyday use, then, a phrase like ‘he expects everybody 
to agree with him’ cannot be simplistically read for its psychologistic import. 
Only at the most superficial level could the utterance be construed as an 
assessment of the ‘personality’ of the psychologist. In the context of its use, it can 
only be read via Husserl’s life-world, the ‘world for us all’. And that must always 
have to do with matters such as membership, its material capacities and 
entitlements, and the achievement of practical ends; that is, with the 
accomplishment of specifically cultural matters. Whatever anyone — lay member 
or psy-complex professional — might assume about the putative internal states 
of the participants (the ‘selves’) in this colloquy, any such assumption will always 
arrive after the fact. So what price psychology’s claim to scientific status when it 
routinely reverses this natural-logical ordering by putting mere assumptions 
(about selves and their putative interior states) prior to the readily-available 
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(cultural) facts? 
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